BYU Law Review
Volume 2017 | Issue 5

Article 8

July 2017

A Solution to Utah’s Non-Compete Dilemma:
Soliciting the Use of Non-Solicitation Agreements
Jerrick Robbins

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics Commons, and the Labor and
Employment Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Jerrick Robbins, A Solution to Utah’s Non-Compete Dilemma: Soliciting the Use of Non-Solicitation Agreements, 2017 BYU L. Rev. 1227
(2018).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol2017/iss5/8

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

5.ROBBINS_FIN.NO HEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

3/12/2018 10:50 AM

A Solution to Utah’s Non-Compete Dilemma:
Soliciting the Use of Non-Solicitation Agreements
Utah has become a hub for company growth and innovation,
especially in an area known as the “Silicon Slopes.” Well-known
companies, like Qualtrics, Adobe, and eBay, have offices along the
Wasatch Front. With such newfound relevance in the business
community, it may seem odd that Utah’s legislature recently passed the
Post-Employment Restrictions Act, which some say threatens Utah’s
position as a state where businesses thrive. The Act restricts non-compete
agreements to periods not greater than one year and automatically
penalizes, through attorney’s fees and costs, any employer who tries to
enforce a non-compete agreement that a court later finds unenforceable
for any reason. The attorney’s fees penalty is particularly troubling for
employers because Utah’s common law, which the Act did not affect
aside from time restrictions, is difficult to navigate when drafting noncompete agreements. The most problematic common-law elements for
employers to meet include whether the non-compete agreement is
necessary to protect goodwill and whether the agreement’s geographic
scope is reasonable. Misinterpreting these common-law elements could
prove extremely costly to employers. This Comment puts forth a solution
for employers who want to protect their investment in employee
training, proprietary and confidential information, and goodwill, but
who are wary of being penalized because a court may find its noncompete agreement unenforceable.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Since the end of the Great Recession, Utah has become a state
famous for its slopes—the “Silicon Slopes.” 1 The name derives from
California’s famous Silicon Valley, an area near San Francisco that is a
hub for technological innovation. 2 Utah’s Silicon Slopes stretches
from Utah County north along the Wasatch Front and includes
1. See Gary R. Herbert, Technology’s New Home Located in ‘Silicon Slopes,’ Utah,
CNBC (July 9, 2013, 10:59 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/100860405.
2. Id.
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several well-known businesses, such as Adobe, Intel, Qualtrics,
Boeing, Vivint, DOMO, and eBay. 3 Silicon Slopes’ software, medical
device, and other startup companies drew over $700 million in
venture capital funding during 2015. 4 Several factors have bolstered
this growth, including religious influences, 5 friendly corporate taxes, 6
high quality of life, 7 low cost of living, 8 an educated workforce, 9 and
a business-friendly environment. 10

3. See id.; Andrew Zaleski, A High-Tech Mecca Rises to Rival Silicon Valley, CNBC,
http://www.cnbc.com/2016/07/13/a-high-tech-mecca-rises-to-rival-silicon-valley.html (last
updated July 14, 2016, 7:54 AM).
4. Zaleski, supra note 3.
5. Id. (“The [Mormon] religion’s influence in the state has helped concentrate
entrepreneurial talent, since graduates aren’t inclined to move far from where they have grown
up. And while a culture that emphasizes family life over business priorities . . . creates some
conflict in the fast-paced world of tech, entrepreneurs and start-up boosters said the Mormon
Church is a great proving ground for would-be tech founders.”).
6. Herbert, supra note 1 (“Our tax policy takes a no-surprises approach. We haven’t
increased corporate taxes for 15 years.”). Since Governor Herbert’s article was written, the
Utah corporate franchise tax has remained at five percent. UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-7-104
(West 2008).
7. Mark Saal, Utah Leads the Country in Tech Sector Growth, STANDARD-EXAMINER
(Aug. 31, 2016, 7:00 AM), http://www.standard.net/Business/2016/08/31/Utah-leadsthe-country-in-tech-sector-growth (“For many millennials, quality of life is a big issue. Being
20 minutes from a ski resort, or 15 minutes from a mountain biking trail, is important
to them.”).
8. Tanner Christensen, Why the Silicon Slopes Are Just Warming Up, INC. (May
18, 2016), http://www.inc.com/tanner-christensen/why-the-silicon-slopes-are-just-warming
-up.html.
9. See Ellen Rosen, Unicorns Help Put Utah’s ‘Silicon Slopes’ on the Tech Map, SEATTLE
TIMES, https://www.seattletimes.com/business/unicorns-help-put-utahs-silicon-slopes-on-th
e-tech-map/ (last updated Oct. 16, 2017, 7:46 PM) (“The local universities have played an
important role in fostering homegrown talent. Brigham Young, the private university affiliated
with the Mormon church, and the public University of Utah have programs intended to
develop young entrepreneurs.”).
10. Zaleski, supra note 3. Notwithstanding these growth factors, commentators suggest
that some factors have slowed this growth from what it could be, especially in regard to
drawing outside talent into the state. See Sara Jarman, Silicon Slopes is Rebranding Utah, KSL
(July 14, 2016, 12:44 PM), http://www.ksl.com/?sid=40641324&nid=1012&title=siliconslopes-is-rebranding-utah (suggesting that Utah’s alcohol laws “scare[] people away” and that
outsiders’ perspectives make it harder to attract people to Utah). Tech companies are also
worried that infrastructure woes may derail growth. See Lee Davidson, Lehi, High-Tech
Companies Say Utah Owes Them Better Highway, Train Line, SALT LAKE TRIBUNE (July 20,
2015, 8:09 AM), http://www.sltrib.com/home/2738453-155/lehis-high-tech-company-say
s-utah-owes. These negative factors likely will have even less of an impact on industry growth
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However, some of these same employers have expressed concern
that by recently enacting the Post-Employment Restrictions Act (the
“Act”), Utah’s legislature may have harmed the businesses it is
trying to attract. 11 The Act primarily serves two functions: (1) it
limits the duration of non-compete agreements entered into on or
after May 10, 2016, to one year, excluding severance agreements and
non-compete agreements arising from a business sale, and (2) it
automatically requires employers to pay costs and attorney’s fees,
along with actual damages, if a court finds an employer’s noncompete agreement unenforceable. 12 The overall effect on businesses
remains to be seen 13 as the law continues to take hold in the
economy and the courts, but these two functions will likely affect
employers in at least two major ways.
First, although the effect of the duration limitation on employers
is unclear, 14 employers may perceive the Act’s one-year provision as a
threat to their control over the dissemination of their confidential
information. 15 Additionally, the Act may disincentivize employers
in the future as startup and technology businesses continue to grow. See Jarman, supra (“It is
becoming easier to get people out here, though. As we build up the tech and startup scene
more, this aspect combined with the quality of life we can offer, it’s possible.”).
11. See generally CICERO, UTAH NON-COMPETE AGREEMENT RESEARCH (2017), https
://issuu.com/saltlakechamber/docs/utah_non-compete_agreement_research (finding that
employers generally believe non-compete agreements should be allowed because they protect
employer interests, and only twenty-nine percent of employers surveyed agree that a time
restriction of less than one year is adequate).
12. See UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 34-51-101 to -301 (West Supp. 2017).
13. One survey, commissioned by the Utah State Legislature and conducted after the
Act’s passage, concluded that “[t]he majority of Employers and Employees were unaware that
Utah passed [the Act] in 2016.” CICERO, supra note 11, at 27. This indicates that an employer
may not recognize the impact the Act may have on the enforceability of its non-compete
agreements until it attempts to enforce an otherwise unenforceable agreement.
14. This Comment does not attempt to speculate about the one-year restriction’s
overall effect on Utah businesses. It addresses the restriction to introduce and give background
to the Act and to explain how the restriction introduces some clarity into the confusing
common-law landscape of enforceable non-compete agreements.
15. See Lisa Petersen & Judson Stelter, Michael Best & Friedrich, Op-ed: Non-Compete
Clauses Help Utah Companies Grow Their Businesses, SALT LAKE TRIBUNE (March 2, 2016,
4:51 PM), http://archive.sltrib.com/article.php?id=3586305&itype=CMSID (“[I]f an
employer cannot prevent an employee from working for a competitor for a reasonable time,
there is little doubt that the former employee will inevitably share confidential information
with his or her new employer or in his or her new business, even if the employee is technically
prohibited from doing so.”); see also CICERO, supra note 11, at 58 (“69% percent of Employers
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from investing in employee development because banning longer
non-compete agreements may significantly increase employee
mobility. 16 Some disagree and argue that non-compete agreements
hurt employers because the agreements actually obstruct employee
mobility, which then hinders innovation in a fast-paced information
society. 17 Regardless, the majority of legal scholars agree that the
limits non-compete agreements place on an employee’s freedom to
choose his or her employer outweigh the effects on employers. 18
Second, 19 and more important to the focus of this Comment, the
Act’s automatic award of attorney’s fees and costs to the employee
clearly has negative implications for businesses. 20 Importantly, the
Act does not state specific situations when the covenant is
unenforceable, but instead dictates only that employers are liable for
attorney’s fees and costs if the covenant is unenforceable—for any
reason. 21 Thus, an employer may be liable for attorney’s fees if its
non-compete agreement satisfies the one-year requirement of the
believe [the Act] will have a negative impact on their ability to protect proprietary ideas,
inventions, or processes.”).
16. See Rachel Arnow-Richman, Noncompetes, Human Capital, and Contract
Formation: What Employment Law Can Learn from Family Law, 10 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV.
155, 158–59 (2003) (discussing how employers are now dependent on human capital and how
that dependency makes employers vulnerable to employee mobility).
17. See Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial
Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 603
(1999) (“The widespread use and enforcement of covenants not to compete slow down high
velocity employment to the point where the level of knowledge spillovers is too low to support
a districtwide innovation cycle.”).
18. See ORLY LOBEL, TALENT WANTS TO BE FREE: WHY WE SHOULD LEARN TO LOVE
LEAKS, RAIDS, AND FREE RIDING 37 (2013) (“But by far the majority of the commentators
are concerned . . . that the enforceability of noncompetes from a fairness perspective limits
employees’ right to work and to freely choose their employer.”); Phillip J. Closius & Henry M.
Schaffer, Involuntary Nonservitude: The Current Judicial Enforcement of Employee Covenants
Not to Compete—A Proposal for Reform, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 531, 539–40 (1984) (“Courts—
and many legislatures—disfavor restraints of trade and, consequently, courts tend to construe
covenants not to compete against the principal seeking its enforcement.”).
19. This Comment will primarily focus on this second aspect of the Act because of its
clear implications for Utah businesses.
20. UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-51-301 (West Supp. 2017) (discussing an automatic award
of attorney’s fees “[i]f an employer seeks to enforce a post-employment restrictive covenant
[defined as a non-compete agreement] through arbitration or by filing a civil action and it is
determined that the post-employment restrictive covenant is unenforceable”).
21. Id.
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Act but violates even one common-law requirement, to which
determining compliance is often difficult. 22
This Comment does not purport to argue that non-compete
agreements in general are constructive or destructive for Utah
businesses. However, this Comment does contend that the Act
damages Utah businesses because it imposes automatic liability for
attorney’s fees on employers who make good-faith efforts to comply
with a confusing common law landscape but are found deficient.
This Comment first provides an overview of the methods and
reasoning behind non-compete agreements. Then it examines the
current state of the law in Utah regarding non-compete agreements,
including both the common law landscape and the Act. Finally, this
Comment proposes a possible solution for employers who want to
protect their interests in company goodwill, employee training, and
confidential information but worry about automatic liability for
attorney’s fees.
II. NON-COMPETE AGREEMENTS: THEIR USE, BENEFITS,
AND DRAWBACKS
Non-compete agreements, first established over 500 years ago in
England, 23 spread in popularity in the United States during the
Industrial Revolution. 24 The agreement “typically provides that the
employee shall not work for a competitor or set up a competitive
business for himself [or herself] for a specified period of time in a

22. See infra Part III; see also Arthur Murray Dance Studios v. Witter, 105 N.E.2d 685,
687 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1952) (discussing non-compete common law as “a sea—vast and
vacillating, overlapping and bewildering. One can fish out of it any kind of strange support for
anything, if he [or she] lives so long”).
23. Hui Shangguan, A Comparative Study of Non-Compete Agreements for Trade Secret
Protection in the United States and China, 11 WASH. J. L. TECH. & ARTS 405, 409 (2016).
24. Id. at 409–10. Often, technology, sales, and managerial employees are required to
sign a non-compete agreement as a condition to employment. Harlan M. Blake, Employee
Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARV. L. REV. 625, 625–26 (1960). Currently, “18 percent, or
30 million, American workers are . . . covered by non-compete agreements.” WHITE HOUSE,
NON-COMPETE AGREEMENTS: ANALYSIS OF THE USAGE, POTENTIAL ISSUES, AND STATE
RESPONSES 3 (2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/non-comp
etes_report_final2.pdf. In one study, approximately 17.85% of Utah employees were currently
covered by non-compete agreements, and nearly half of Utah employers reported using noncompete agreements. CICERO, supra note 11, at 12–13.
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designated geographical area.” 25 Employers usually enforce noncompete agreements at the state level, with statutes and common law
governing the boundaries of the agreements. 26
This Part examines the benefits to the employer and drawbacks
to the employee of using non-compete agreements, a useful analysis
when determining their value in light of the fees and cost obligations
that the Act imposes. This Part will then briefly discuss the ways
other states regulate non-compete agreements to contextualize
Utah’s recent Act within a national framework.
A. The Benefits and Drawbacks of Non-Compete Agreements in
Employer-Employee Relationships
1. Benefits to employers
Recently, more and more employees no longer see themselves as
restricted to climbing one particular corporate ladder; rather, a
decline in manufacturing trades and a rise in information-dependent
industries has led to increased employee mobility within different
industries. 27 For employers, any advantages of increased employee
mobility, such as an increased talent pool of employees, is likely
countered by the risk of losing current employees, whose skills are
the employers’ “most valuable assets.” 28 Four main reasons explain
why employers utilize non-compete agreements to combat this new
trend. Each will be discussed below.
a. Non-compete agreements protect an employer’s trade secrets. 29
Trade secrets include any “business information that is kept
confidential to maintain an advantage over competitors.”30

25. Blake, supra note 24, at 626.
26. Shangguan, supra note 23, at 410.
27. Arnow-Richman, supra note 16, at 157; Matt Marx, The Firm Strikes Back: NonCompete Agreements and the Mobility of Technical Professionals, 76 AM. SOC. REV. 695,
695 (2011).
28. See Marx, supra note 27, at 696.
29. See Stuart C. Irby Co. v. Tipton, 796 F.3d 918, 924 (8th Cir. 2015).
30. Trade Secret, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). Additionally, the
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition defines “trade secret” as “any information that can
be used in the operation of a business or other enterprise and that is sufficiently valuable and
secret to afford an actual or potential economic advantage over others.” RESTATEMENT
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Protecting an employer’s trade secrets has been deemed “[t]he main
economic and societally beneficial use[] of non-competes,” 31 likely
because trade secrets have independent, economic value that
depends in pertinent part on their confidentiality. 32
However, employers frequently use non-compete agreements
even if protecting trade secrets is not obviously a legitimate goal.
Those situations include jobs in which employees do not need fouryear college degrees or earn significant compensation. 33 Because
almost thirty percent of non-compete agreements occur in situations
in which trade secret protection is likely inapplicable, 34 trade secret
protection alone cannot justify employers’ growing use of noncompete agreements. 35
b. Non-compete agreements promote an employer’s goodwill. 36 An
employer’s goodwill is defined as

(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 (AM. LAW INST. 1995). By these definitions, “trade
secrets” also includes customer lists because customer lists are often confidential and obviously
valuable to the company. As such, customer lists are expressly included in this discussion of
trade secrets.
31. WHITE HOUSE, supra note 24, at 4.
32. See Trade Secret, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
33. See WHITE HOUSE, supra note 24, at 4 (“If protection of trade secrets were the
main explanation for non-compete agreements, then one would expect such agreements to be
highly concentrated among workers with advanced education and occupations entrusted with
trade secrets. However, 15 percent of workers without a four-year college degree are subject to
non-competes, and 14 percent of workers earning less than $40,000 have non-competes. This
is true even though workers without four-year degrees are half as likely to possess trade secrets
as those with four-year degrees, and workers earning less than $40,000 possess trade secrets at
less than half of the rate of their higher-earning counterparts.”).
34. Id. (twenty-nine percent of non-compete agreements occur in occupations where
employees earn less than $40,000 per year plus occupations where employees did not earn a
four-year degree). In Utah specifically, thirteen percent of food preparation employees are
asked to sign non-compete agreements. CICERO, supra note 11, at 17. Additionally, fourteen
percent of Utah employees with less than a high-school education sign non-compete
agreements. Id. at 20.
35. Some authors argue that protecting trade secrets is inappropriate no matter the
situation. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in Search of
Justification, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 241, 245 (1998) (arguing that “[n]either the fact that a trade
secret is information nor the fact that it is secret provides a convincing reason to impose
liability for a nonconsensual taking”).
36. See Radio One, Inc. v. Wooten, 452 F. Supp. 2d 754, 758 (E.D. Mich. 2006)
(finding that the plaintiff had an “interest in protecting its business good will” through a noncompete agreement).
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the advantage . . . acquired by an establishment, beyond the mere
value of the capital, stocks, funds or property employed therein, in
consequence of the general patronage . . . it receives from . . .
habitual customers on account of its location, or local position or
reputation for quality, skill, integrity or punctuality. 37

A former employee could harm this goodwill by drawing away
recurring customers from the former employer or by spreading
negative information about the former employer to its current
customers. 38 A non-compete agreement limits this possibility by
restricting the former employee to work in markets that are not
simultaneously occupied by the former employer.
c. Non-compete agreements protect an employer’s investment in
employee training. 39 Many employers invest significant resources into
specialized employee training. 40 Some argue that without noncompete agreements, employers will lose the incentive “to invest
time, money and training in their employees if they can simply leave
with that skill and training and go to work for a direct competitor.” 41
Non-compete agreements protect an employer’s investment in
employee training by providing the employee with a perceived
constraint commitment42 to stay in the employee-employer
relationship. In other words, non-compete agreements make it more
difficult for the employee to leave the employer and, from the

37. Peterson v. Jackson, 2011 UT App 113, ¶ 35, 253 P.3d 1096, 1106 (Utah Ct.
App. 2011) (quoting Jackson v. Caldwell, 415 P.2d 667, 670 (Utah 1966)).
38. See generally Allen v. Rose Park Pharmacy, 237 P.2d 823, 827–28 (Utah 1951)
(“[A] covenant not to compete is necessary for the protection of the goodwill of the business
when it is shown that although the employee learns no trade secrets, he may likely draw away
customers from his former employer, if he were permitted to compete nearby.”).
39. See generally Borg-Warner Protective Servs. Corp. v. Guardsmark, Inc., 946 F.
Supp. 495 (E.D. Ky. 1996) (finding employee training as an interest which non-compete
agreements may protect).
40. William R. Knowlton, Implementing Noncompete Agreements in Utah: Protecting
Business Trade Secrets, Goodwill, and Investment in Employees, UTAH Bus. J., May/June 2014,
at 16, 17.
41. Petersen & Stelter, supra note 15.
42. In relationships, including employer-employee relationships, “constraint
commitment reflects feelings of entrapment or barriers to exiting a relationship.” Michelle
Givertz, Chris Segrin & Alesia Hanzal, The Association Between Satisfaction and Commitment
Differs Across Marital Couple Types, 36 COMM. RES. 561, 564 (2009).
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employer’s perspective, waste the time and resources it provided to
the employee during training.
d. Non-compete agreements foster company research and development. 43 Theoretically, by allowing non-compete agreements to
protect trade secrets, employers are encouraged to “pursu[e]
technological, medical, and other advances, inasmuch as society as a
whole would continue to benefit from such advances.” 44 According
to employers, this pursuit of additional research and development
should “support the growth of business.” 45 However, some research
indicates that non-compete agreements are associated with decreased
spending on research and development, 46 a lack of employee
motivation, 47 and a general dearth of startup companies. 48 These
indications largely refute the claim that non-compete agreements are
good for business by fostering research and development. 49
2. Drawbacks to employees
Even with the perceived benefits and interests to employers that
non-compete agreements may protect, courts are still reluctant to
enforce non-compete agreements, primarily because of the effects of

43. Abigail Shechtman Nicandri, Comment, The Growing Disfavor of Non-Compete
Agreements in the New Economy and Alternative Approaches for Protecting Employers’
Proprietary Information and Trade Secrets, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1003, 1013 (2011).
44. Jessica Lee, The Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine: Safeguarding the Privacy of Trade
Secrets, 33 COLO. LAW. 17, 17 (2004).
45. Petersen & Stelter, supra note 15.
46. Nicandri, supra note 43, at 1013 (“[E]nforcement of CNCs [non-compete
agreements] actually tends to be accompanied by decreased spending on R&D [research
and design].”).
47. Id. at 1013–14 (stating that an employee’s motivation “to develop new ideas for an
existing employer” may decrease “since the employee knows he [or she] will not be able to
profit from the idea or start a new business using that concept”).
48. Id. at 1014.
49. Regardless, employers still use the research and development argument as support
for non-compete agreements, and thus the argument is included here. See id. at 1013; WHITE
HOUSE, supra note 24, at 2 (“The main rationale for these agreements is to
encourage innovation . . . .”).
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non-compete agreements on employees. 50 Two main drawbacks are
addressed below.
a. Non-compete agreements promote an imbalance of bargaining
power. 51 Employees generally have less bargaining power than
employers because their livelihood is tied to a good-paying job. 52
Therefore, employers can exploit this imbalance of power by
imposing non-compete agreements on employees who otherwise
would not accept them. 53 The imbalance grows when an alreadyhired employee enters into a non-compete agreement with a current
employer because the “threat of discharge” exists. 54
b. Non-compete agreements hinder employee mobility and restrict
employee choice. 55 Society generally favors employee mobility because
it ensures that employees will have the best chance of being
productive members of society and achieving success. 56 However,
by their nature, non-compete agreements restrict movement by
preventing employees from working in certain geographical areas for
some amount of time or from working for other employers for
specified amounts of time.

50. Rachel Arnow-Richman, Cubewrap Contracts and Worker Mobility: The Dilution of
Employee Bargaining Power Via Standard Form Noncompetes, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 963,
965 [hereinafter Arnow-Richman, Cubewrap Contracts].
51. See Viva R. Moffat, The Wrong Tool for the Job: The IP Problem with Noncompetition
Agreements, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 873, 882 (2010) (discussing standard-form contracts,
including non-compete agreements, as “the product of vastly unequal bargaining power”).
52. Arnow-Richman, Cubewrap Contracts, supra note 50, at 963–64.
53. Id. at 966–67.
54. Michael J. Garrison & John T. Wendt, Employee Non-Competes and Consideration:
A Proposed Good Faith Standard for the “Afterthought” Agreement, 64 U. KAN. L. REV. 409,
412–13 (2015) (“An employee’s bargaining power is substantially diminished after
employment has commenced, and the threat of discharge is a potent weapon that employers
can use to secure an afterthought agreement (a non-compete agreement signed after
employment commences).”).
55. Lee, supra note 44, at 17.
56. Norman D. Bishara & Michelle Westermann-Behaylo, The Law and Ethics of
Restrictions on an Employee’s Post-Employment Mobility, 49 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 7–8 (2012).
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B. States’ Regulation of Non-Compete Agreements 57
State laws regarding non-compete agreements are as varied as the
reasons for having non-compete agreements. Commentators
generally separate these laws into three different groups: (1) laws
that allow non-compete agreements if the agreements meet a
reasonableness standard, (2) laws that prohibit non-compete
agreements with some exceptions, and (3) laws that ban employeremployee non-compete agreements altogether. 58 Utah’s Act creates a
hybrid of these different approaches that presents some difficulties. 59
Many states follow some sort of common-law reasonableness
approach based on the historical development of non-compete
agreements “as restraints on trade.” 60 Consequently, the
reasonableness approach scrutinizes non-compete agreements more
thoroughly than traditional contract law. 61 Presumably, the
reasonableness approach tries to balance non-compete agreements’
competing benefits to employers and detriments to employees by
establishing an enforceability formulation: “[A] covenant in an
agreement between an employer and a former employee restricting

57. This section only attempts to categorize the many different state laws regarding
non-compete agreements to provide context and background for the discussion in Part III of
Utah’s Act. Each approach to non-compete agreements has its proponents and detractors, a
discussion of which would be too expansive for the scope of this Comment. For a discussion of
the benefits of a complete ban on non-compete agreements, see LOBEL, supra note 18; On
Amir & Orly Lobel, Driving Performance: A Growth Theory of Noncompete Law, 16 STAN.
TECH. L. REV. 833 (2013); Gilson, supra note 17. For scholars who question the reasoning
and data in support of bans on non-compete agreements, see Norman D. Bishara & Evan
Starr, The Incomplete Noncompete Picture, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 497 (2016); Jonathan
M. Barnett & Ted Sichelman, Revisiting Labor Mobility in Innovation Markets (Univ. S. Cal.
Ctr. for Law and Soc. Sci. Research Papers Series, Paper No. CLASS16-13, 2016),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2758854.
58. Viva R. Moffat, Making Non-Competes Unenforceable, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 939,
941 (2012).
59. See discussion infra Part III.
60. Moffat, supra note 58, at 945. Of these states, some “have non-compete statutes
that essentially restate the common-law rule of reason.” Id. at 948.
61. See generally Daniel P. O’Gorman, Contract Theory and Some Realism About
Employee Covenant Not to Compete Cases, 65 SMU L. REV. 145, 184 (2012) (“[B]ecause
[non-compete] agreements were considered in restraint of trade and therefore had to be
‘reasonable’ to be enforced, such agreements would never be welcomed fully into the realm of
pure contract and its related idea of ‘freedom of contract.’”).
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the former employee’s working activities is enforceable only if it is
reasonably tailored in scope, geography, and time to further a
protectable interest of the employer.” 62 Virginia, New York,
Texas, and Delaware are some of the states that follow the
reasonableness standard. 63
A minority of states, like Colorado, 64 Louisiana, 65 and Nevada, 66
generally prohibit non-compete agreements between employers and
employees unless the agreements fall within specific exceptions.
These states have a desire “to prevent an individual from
contractually depriving himself [or herself] of the ability to support
himself [or herself] and consequently becoming a public burden.”67
However, they also recognize “limited instances in which a contract
can restrict the exercise of a lawful profession,” 68 such as promoting
an employer’s goodwill.
California leads the small number of states that have banned
non-compete agreements entirely, 69 joined only by Montana, 70 North
62. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMP’T LAW § 8.06 (AM. LAW INST. 1999). Many states
utilize some form of these factors. See, e.g., Senture, LLC v. Dietrich, 575 F. Supp. 2d 724,
728 (E.D. Va. 2008) (discussing that Kentucky law takes into account geographic and time
restrictions when determining reasonableness in non-compete agreements); Nat. Organics,
Inc. v. Kirkendall, 860 N.Y.S.2d 142, 143 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008) (“A non-compete agreement
must also be reasonably limited temporally and geographically.”).
63. For an extensive survey of all states and their non-compete laws, see Employee
Noncompetes: A State by State Survey, BECK REED RIDDEN LLP, https://www.faircompetitionl
aw.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Noncompetes-50-State-Survey-Chart-20170711.pdf
(last updated July 11, 2017) (except for the states mentioned here, the accuracy of this survey
has not been independently verified).
64. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-2-113 (West 2013). In Colorado, covenants not to
compete are void unless contracted to protect trade secrets, among other exceptions. Id.
65. LA. STAT. ANN. § 23:921(C) (2010 & Supp. 2017). In Louisiana, non-compete
agreements are unenforceable unless agreed upon within a specific area and during a specific
time frame not to exceed two years. Id.
66. NEV. REV. STAT. § 613.200 (2015). In Nevada, any employer who willfully
prevents any employee from gaining employment elsewhere “is guilty of a gross misdemeanor
and shall be punished by a fine of not more than $5,000.” Id. Excepted from this restriction is
an agreement that prevents the employee from directly competing with the former employer or
disclosing to a future employer any trade secrets of the former employer. Id.
67. USI Ins. Servs., LLC v. Tappel, 09-149, p. 7 (La. App. 5 Cir. 11/10/09); 28 So.
3d 419, 423 (La. Ct. App. 2009).
68. Id., 28 So. 3d at 424.
69. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 2017) (“Except as provided in this
chapter, every contract by which anyone is restrained from engaging in a lawful profession,
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Dakota, 71 and Oklahoma. 72 By banning the agreements, these states
demonstrate that, for their state policies, “open competition and
employee mobility” and protecting “the important legal right of
persons to engage in businesses and occupations of their choosing” 73
outweigh the benefits that non-compete agreements give
to employers.
III. THE CURRENT STATE OF
NON-COMPETE AGREEMENTS IN UTAH
Utah, however, does not fit comfortably in any of the above
categories. Unlike states that have generally prohibited or entirely
banned non-compete agreements, Utah law allows for non-compete
agreements, 74 which situates Utah closer to states that follow the
common-law reasonableness approach. However, Utah non-compete
agreements are not entirely governed by the reasonableness standard
because although time restrictions greater than one year may be

trade, or business of any kind is to that extend void.”). Exceptions do not involve employeeemployer non-compete agreements but instead involve non-competes in relation to the sale of
a business, § 16601, the dissolution of a partnership, § 16602, or the sale of a limited liability
company, § 16602.5. California clearly has had success while employing this model, but the
other states following the model have not had the same success. Thus, other factors must be
contributing to California’s growth that minimize the effect that California’s ban on noncompete agreements is having on businesses in the state. See, e.g., Brad Templeton, The Real
Secret Behind Silicon Valley’s Success, FORBES (July 11, 2012, 5:00 PM), https://www.
forbes.com/sites/singularity/2012/07/11/the-real-secret-behind-silicon-valleys-success/#40
8a39b775e1 (summarizing several factors contributing to Silicon Valley growth in California
and hypothesizing that a strong sense of the American dream in immigrant business founders is
a leading factor); Neil Koenig, Next Silicon Valleys: How Did California Get It So Right?, BBC
(Feb. 9, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-26041341 (interviewing several
Silicon Valley experts “why they thought the area had been so successful”).
70. MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-703 (West 2009) (“Any contract by which anyone is
restrained from exercising a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind . . . is to that
extent void.”).
71. N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-08-06 (2006) (“Every contract by which anyone is
restrained from exercising a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind is to that extent
void . . . .”). North Dakota has the same exceptions as California with regards to selling a
business or partnership. Id.
72. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 219A (West 2013).
73. Edwards v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 189 P.3d 285, 291 (Cal. 2008).
74. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-51-201 (West Supp. 2017).
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reasonable in some circumstances under the common law, 75 the Act
summarily rejects those restrictions. 76 Thus, Utah law is not entirely
comparable to the common-law reasonableness states. The outright
rejection of all non-compete agreements greater than one year is
more like the policy of states that ban non-compete agreements
altogether. Therefore, because Utah utilizes both statutory
requirements and common-law reasonableness, and bans some noncompete agreements all together, Utah is a hybrid of the different
approaches to non-compete agreements.
Like states that either ban non-compete agreements entirely or
severely restrict their use, Utah, through the Act, seems to prioritize
employee mobility and employee right to choose their employers and
occupations. Representative Mike Schultz, one of the Act’s sponsors
in the House of Representatives, stated that the Act will “mak[e] it
so that the employees of our state have the opportunity to go out
and start their own businesses if they would like” and can “move to
another job to . . . be able to provide for their families.”77 However,
Representative Schultz also stated that, regarding the attorney’s fees
mandate of the Act, “those who have legitimate reasons for their
non-compete agreements will be just fine.” 78 Unfortunately,
Representative Schultz’s statement ignored the intricacies of Utah’s
statutory-and-common-law world for non-compete agreements. The
following discussion will show that, although the Act was enacted
based on compelling policy reasons, the confusing state of the
common law—which was in large part unremedied by the Act—
leaves a difficult task for employers when determining how to craft
enforceable non-compete agreements that will avoid automatic
attorney’s fees and costs.

75. See, e.g., Sys. Concepts, Inc. v. Dixon, 669 P.2d 421, 426 (Utah 1983) (“The
subject [anticompetition] covenant contains a two-year time restriction, which is clearly, or at
least ‘probably’ reasonable . . . .”).
76. See § 34-51-201.
77. Utah 2016 General Legislative Session, House - Day 44 2016 Part 3, at 2:20:08,
UTAH STATE LEGISLATURE, http://utahlegislature.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?clip_id=
20219&meta_id=629364 (last visited Dec. 2, 2017) (House Floor Debate on 10 H.B. 251,
Post-Employment Restrictions Amendments, held Mar. 9, 2016) (statement of Rep. Schultz).
78. Id. at 2:21:40.
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A. The Common-Law Requirement(s) of
Enforceable Non-Compete Agreements
Currently, Utah’s common law governing non-compete
agreements seems to follow two competing tests, each stemming
from a Utah Supreme Court case decided in 1951, Allen v. Rose Park
Pharmacy. 79 These competing standards will be discussed in turn,
followed by an analysis of the most difficult factors in each test
that an employer must meet to draft an enforceable noncompete agreement.
1. The Rose Park standard
In Rose Park, an employee signed a non-compete agreement
upon beginning employment as a manager for a pharmacy. 80 The
non-compete agreement stated that for a period of five years after
termination, the employee would not work for a pharmacy or drug
store within a two-mile radius of the pharmacy. 81 After only one year
of employment, the pharmacy terminated the employee. 82 The
employee sued to determine if the non-compete agreement was
enforceable, presumably because the employee wished to operate a
competing business within the two-mile radius. 83 The court held that
the non-compete agreement was valid because the agreement (1)
was supported by adequate consideration, (2) was not negotiated in
bad faith, (3) was “necessary to protect the good will of the

79. See Allen v. Rose Park Pharmacy, 237 P.2d 823 (Utah 1951). This case, and the two
competing standards that come from it, seems to illustrate the belief that “the ambiguity
surrounding the enforceability of [non-competes] has resulted in vast amounts of litigation and
reported appellate decisions. Despite this abundance of legal precedent, it still is difficult for
lawyers to predict confidently how a court will react to any given noncompetition clause.”
Peter J. Whitmore, A Statistical Analysis of Noncompetition Clauses in Employment Contracts,
15 J. CORP. L. 483, 485 (1990) (citations omitted).
80. Rose Park, 237 P.2d at 824.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 824–25.
83. Id. The employee sued “for a declaratory judgment to determine the validity of [a
non-compete agreement] in the contract of employment.” Id. The employer had not yet tried
to enforce the non-compete agreement, so the employee was not challenging the enforceability
of the non-compete agreement. Instead, the employee likely wanted to preemptively make sure
the agreement would not be enforceable before operating the competing business.
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business,” and (4) was “reasonable in its restrictions as to time
and area.” 84
2. The Robbins standard and subsequent cases
Even though the Rose Park opinion succinctly stated the factors
that the court examined while determining enforceability, a later
opinion muddied the waters. In Robbins v. Finlay, a hearing aid
salesman quit his job and immediately started a rival business selling
hearing aids. 85 This action directly violated his non-compete
agreement, which stated that the salesman would not compete with
the employer in Utah for one year after terminating employment.86
The employer sued to enforce the agreement, but the court held that
the agreement was unenforceable because the salesman did not
possess trade secrets that were afforded protection. 87 In so holding,
the court seemed to add additional requirements to the Rose
Park factors:
Covenants not to compete are enforceable if carefully drawn to
protect only the legitimate interests of the employer. The
reasonableness of a covenant depends upon several factors,
including its geographical extent; the duration of the limitation; the
nature of the employee’s duties; and the nature of the interest
which the employer seeks to protect such as trade secrets, the
goodwill of his business, or an extraordinary investment in the
training or education of the employee. 88

In Robbins—contrary to Rose Park—the Court neglected
consideration and bad faith as factors to consider but introduced
employee duties, employer trade secrets, and employee training. 89

84. Id. at 828.
85. Robbins v. Finlay, 645 P.2d 623, 624 (Utah 1982).
86. Id. at 624 n.2.
87. Id. at 628.
88. Id. at 627. The court cited as the first authority for this position a case from
Pennsylvania. Id. The court only cited Rose Park as additional support for its position, along
with cases from Nebraska, and the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. Id. By not citing Rose
Park as the first authority and limiting its statement to the requirements therein, the court
seemed to expand upon the holding in Rose Park.
89. See id. But see Rose Park, 237 P.2d at 828.
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Soon after Robbins was decided, the Utah Supreme Court
appeared to remedy the Robbins decision in System Concepts, Inc. v.
Dixon by requiring non-compete agreements to satisfy the specific
standards set forth in Rose Park, 90 not Robbins. Dixon seemed to
implicitly return the standard to Rose Park by adding consideration
and bad faith to the equation and removing employee duties, trade
secrets, and employee training. 91 But Dixon did not specifically
overturn the additional factors in Robbins.
Therefore, while courts in a majority of cases have applied the
Rose Park standard, 92 some courts still follow the Robbins factors. For
example, in Systems West Performance, LLC v. Farland, a Utah federal
district court held that a non-compete agreement was reasonable,
and therefore enforceable, because the agreement satisfied all the
Robbins factors. 93 Additionally, in Scenic Aviation, Inc. v. Blick, the
same court found a restrictive covenant unenforceable because the
covenant was not “carefully drawn to protect only the legitimate
interests of the employer,” specifically the employer’s trade secrets
and goodwill as required in Robbins. 94 Other cases follow these
examples. 95 Thus, because of the competing Rose Park and Robbins
standards, Utah employers may be unsure of which standard their
non-compete agreements should be structured to meet.

90. Sys. Concepts, Inc. v. Dixon, 669 P.2d 421 (Utah 1983). For a non-compete
agreement to be enforceable, the “requirements are that: (1) the covenant be supported by
consideration; (2) no bad faith be shown in the negotiation of the contract; (3) the covenant
be necessary to protect the goodwill of the business; and (4) it be reasonable in its restrictions
as to time and area.” Id. at 425–26.
91. See id.
92. See, e.g., Elec. Distribs., Inc. v. SFR, Inc., 166 F.3d 1074 (10th Cir. 1999)
(applying Utah law); Bad Ass Coffee Co. of Haw., Inc. v. JH Nterprises, L.L.C., 636 F. Supp.
2d 1237, 1245–46 (D. Utah 2009); TruGreen Cos. v. Mower Bros., 2008 UT 81, 199
P.3d 929.
93. Sys. W. Performance, LLC v. Farland, No. 2:14-cv-00276-DN-BCW, 2015 WL
4920962, at *3–5 (D. Utah Aug. 18, 2015).
94. Scenic Aviation, Inc. v. Blick, No. 2:02-CV-01201 PGC, 2003 WL 26060445, at
*5 (D. Utah Aug. 4, 2003).
95. See, e.g., First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. Nw. Title Ins. Agency, LLC, No. 2:15-cv00229-DN, 2016 WL 6902473 (D. Utah Nov. 23, 2016); Hunt v. Key, No. 2:13CV83, 2014
WL 722487 (D. Utah Feb. 24, 2014); Kasco Servs. Corp. v. Benson, 831 P.2d 86 (Utah
1992) (discussing both the Robbins and Rose Park standards).
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3. Inconsistency within the factors
Even if a court applies the standard that an employer anticipates,
some factors within the standards are often applied inconsistently. 96
Each such factor is examined below. 97
a. Goodwill. Courts have a difficult time determining whether a
non-compete agreement is necessary to protect a company’s
goodwill in large part because of “a strong connection between [an
employer’s] ability to stop a former [employee] from competing and
[the employer’s] goodwill.” 98 In Bad Ass Coffee Co. of Hawaii v. JH
Nterprises, L.L.C., the court found that a non-compete agreement
was enforceable because the agreement protected a coffee shop’s
goodwill. 99 The court reasoned that two factors contributed to the
necessity of the non-compete agreement in protecting the coffee
shop’s goodwill: (1) the employee opening a competing coffee shop
could be seen as a negative message about the coffee shop to the
market, and (2) allowing the employee to open a competing shop
could send a message to other employees that the behavior
was acceptable. 100

96. The other factors left undiscussed are applied relatively consistently in Utah.
97. Some have written that consideration may also be applied inconsistently in the
future. See Darren Nadel & Stephen E. Baumann, II, Utah Enacts Post-Employment Restrictions
Act, LITTLER (March 31, 2016), https://www.littler.com/publication-press/publication/
utah-enacts-post-employment-restrictions-act (“Adequate consideration will be a fluid concept.
In fact, the final version of the Act excluded a proposed definition of ‘[a]dequate
consideration’ that was limited to ‘compensation, stocks, or anything of economic value that is
paid, granted, given, donated, or transferred to an employee in a single transaction and that
equals or exceeds 5% of the annual salary of the employee determined as of the day on which a
post-employment restrictive covenant is signed.’”). Current case law indicates that
consideration has been applied consistently so far. This makes some intuitive sense because
non-compete agreements are often part of employment contracts. Employment contracts are
rarely unsupported by consideration because “an employer’s promise of employment under
certain terms and for an indefinite period constitutes . . . the employer’s consideration for the
employment contract. The employee’s performance of service pursuant to the employer’s offer
constitutes . . . the employee’s consideration for the contract.” Johnson v. Morton Thiokol,
Inc., 818 P.2d 997, 1002 (Utah 1991). Therefore, this factor was not discussed in detail in
this Comment.
98. Bad Ass Coffee Co. of Haw., Inc. v. JH Nterprises, L.L.C., 636 F. Supp. 2d 1237,
1245–46 (D. Utah 2009).
99. Id. at 1246.
100. Id.
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The employee, in defense of his position that the non-compete
agreement failed to reasonably protect the coffee shop’s goodwill,
argued that the plain language of the agreement meant that the
employee could not open any store, shop, restaurant, or other
establishment that happened to sell coffee and thus compete with
the coffee shop. 101 The employee believed that this plain language
pointed to the non-compete agreement restricting activities that
were unrelated to the coffee shop’s goodwill. 102 The court disagreed,
reasoning that, in Utah, “courts avoid reading covenants not to
compete in a manner that would render them unreasonable,”103
and the employee’s proposed reading would render the
agreement unreasonable. 104
However, the court failed to consider a key principle underlying
the Robbins factors when deciding that Utah courts do not read noncompete agreements in a way that would create unreasonable
agreements: “Covenants not to compete are enforceable if carefully
drawn to protect only the legitimate interests of the employer.”105
The Robbins court indicated that the plain language of the noncompete agreement should be carefully drawn to avoid limiting
competition. 106 Therefore, if a non-compete agreement is designed
primarily to limit employer competition or restrain choice, the noncompete agreement is unenforceable because limiting competition
and restraining choice likely are not legitimate interests. 107 These
statements seem to contradict the Bad Ass Coffee court’s decision to
avoid reading the covenant in an unreasonable way. Of course, the
Bad Ass Coffee court was applying the Rose Park standard, 108 so
perhaps the Robbins standard requires carefully-drawn agreements

101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. See id. at 1246–47 (declaring, after discussing the employee’s proposed reading, that
employees “are unlikely to convince a court (or arbitrator) that the non-compete clauses at
issue here are unenforceable”).
105. Robbins v. Finlay, 645 P.2d 623, 627 (Utah 1982) (emphasis added).
106. See id. (“In this case, the covenant [not to compete] served no purpose other than
restricting an employee from competing with a former employer.”).
107. See id.
108. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
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when examining its goodwill factor, while the Rose Park standard
allows courts to avoid unreasonable renditions of non-compete
agreements while analyzing its own goodwill factor. But this
distinction is not clear from the Bad Ass Coffee court’s analysis. 109
b. Limitations on scope. Both the Robbins and Rose Park standards
require reasonable limitations on time and area restrictions. 110 The
reasonableness of these restraints is “determined on a case-by-case
basis, taking into account the particular facts and circumstances
surrounding the case” and the non-compete agreement. 111 When
circumstances are taken into account on a case-by-case basis,
uncertainty about the legality of non-compete agreements
increases. 112 This uncertainty, in turn, leads courts to apply
inconsistent limitations on the scope of non-compete agreements.
Uncertainty in both time and geographic limitations are
examined below.
(1) Uncertainty about how courts evaluate limitations on time
has produced widely varied results. Courts generally uphold a time
limitation if it is “necessary in its full extent for the protection of
some legitimate interest of the promisee, and it must not be unduly
harsh and oppressive to the covenantor.” 113 However, courts have
been inconsistent in their application of this rule. For example, Utah
courts have declared non-compete agreements valid with one-year to
twenty-five-year time restrictions. 114 The facts of these cases range
from a one-year provision for title company office managers 115 to a

109. See generally Bad Ass Coffee Co., 636 F. Supp. 2d 1237.
110. Robbins, 645 P.2d at 627; Allen v. Rose Park Pharmacy, 237 P.2d 823, 828
(Utah 1951).
111. Elec. Distribs., Inc. v. SFR, Inc., 166 F.3d 1074, 1085 (10th Cir. 1999) (quoting
Sys. Concepts, Inc. v. Dixon, 669 P.2d 421, 427 (Utah 1983)) (applying Utah law). One
important consideration in this determination is “the location and nature of the employer’s
clientele.” Id. (quoting Sys. Concepts, 669 P.2d at 427).
112. See Alan A. Fisher & Robert H. Lande, Efficiency Considerations in Merger
Enforcement, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 1580, 1655 (1983) (“Any type of a case-by-case approach
would greatly increase business uncertainty.”).
113. Elec. Distribs., 166 F.3d at 1085.
114. Christopher Mack, Note, Postemployment Noncompete Agreements: Why Utah Should
Depart from the Majority, 2015 UTAH L. REV. 1201, 1204.
115. See First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. Nw. Title Ins. Agency, LLC, No. 2:15-cv-00229-DN,
2016 WL 6902473, at *17 (D. Utah Nov. 23, 2016).
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twenty-five-year agreement relating to the sale of a mortuary.116
These mixed results provide little guidance to employers trying to
draft enforceable non-compete agreements.
(2) Uncertainty about how courts determine the reasonableness
of geographic limitations makes it difficult for employers to structure
the limitation. “Ordinarily, a covenant is enforceable if it specifies an
area no greater than that to which the business extends, and it is
unenforceable if it specifies a territory broader than encompassed by
the . . . business.”117 But determining the area in which a business
extends is a difficult task. 118 For example, in Electrical Distributors,
Inc. v. SFR, Inc., the court held that a restriction not to compete in
the entire state of Utah for seven years was reasonable because the
company enforcing the non-compete agreement had customers in
several different cities throughout the state. 119 However, the court
admitted that the question of “where the bulk of the customers were
located” was left unanswered. 120 In that case, the question was not
enough to call into doubt the reasonableness of the restriction, 121 but
under a different set of circumstances, it may be enough to tip the
scale toward unreasonableness. 122
However, the customers’ location may not be as important as the
employee’s operating region within the company’s geographical area.
For example, in Vivint, Inc. v. Dahl, a Utah state district court case,
116. See Valley Mortuary v. Fairbanks, 225 P.2d 739, 741–42 (Utah 1950).
117. Elec. Distribs., 166 F.3d at 1085.
118. Kyle B. Sill, Drafting Effective Noncompete Clauses and Other Restrictive Covenants:
Considerations Across the United States, 14 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 365, 380 (2013) (“Courts
have upheld—and conversely rejected—distances from a few miles, to cities, entire states,
countries, and the world.”).
119. Elec. Distribs., 166 F.3d at 1085.
120. Id.
121. See id.
122. For example, imagine a company that has thousands of clients in Nevada, Utah, and
Idaho. That same company has only a few hundred clients in California, but these clients are
spread out from San Francisco southward to San Diego. The company requires its employees
to sign a non-compete agreement as a condition to employment. The agreement states that the
employee, for a certain number of years, will not perform work in the company’s industry in
the states of Nevada, Utah, Idaho, and California. Even though the company has clients in
California, the minimal number of clients compared with the loss of employee mobility (not
being able to work in California, with its millions of residents) may persuade a court to reason
differently than the court in Electrical Distributors.
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the court granted a former employee’s Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment on the issue of whether a restrictive covenant was
unenforceable. 123 The restrictive covenant provided that the
employee would not compete against Vivint by convincing any
customer to cease dealing with the company. 124 In granting the
motion, the court reasoned that the employee, who sold alarm
systems to customers in only two states, could not be restricted from
competing against his former employer by coming into contact with
any customer in essentially any area of the United States. 125 This
restriction, even though limited to only Vivint customers, was not
“reasonably tailored to protect the interests of Vivint.” 126
While the agreement in question did not specify a geographic
area, the court imputed one to the agreement by inferring from the
circumstances that Vivint intended to restrict the employee to noncompetition in any area where the company also operated. 127 Thus,
in contrast with Electrical Distributors, in which the court analyzed
the reasonableness of a geographic limitation by examining the
number of customers in a particular area, the Vivint court analyzed
the reasonableness of a geographic limitation by the actual contact
that an employee had with the company in a geographic area.
But, in Systems West Performance, a Utah federal district court
found that a non-compete provision devoid of any geographic
restrictions was still “reasonably limited by certain activity
restrictions.” 128 Specifically, the activity restrictions forbade the
employee “from working for any client or prospective client of [the
employer].” 129 This limitation was even broader than the
unreasonable restriction in Vivint not to contact its customers,

123. In this case, the covenant seems to combine non-solicitation and non-compete
agreements together. The court analyzed both under the Rose Park standard. See Order
Granting Defendant’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 2–5, Vivint, Inc. v. Dahl, No.
130401309 (4th Dist. Ct. Utah Mar. 21, 2016).
124. Id. at 2.
125. Id. at 5.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Sys. W. Performance, LLC v. Farland, No. 2:14-cv-00276-DN-BCW, 2015 WL
4920962, at *4 (D. Utah Aug. 18, 2015).
129. Id.
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because this limitation also included prospective customers. Yet, the
court here found that the restriction was reasonable. 130
These three cases highlight some of the difficult uncertainties
that employers face when drafting enforceable, reasonable
geographic restrictions: uncertainty as to (1) the area in which a
business operates, (2) the importance of the employee’s involvement
in that area, and (3) the interpretation of provisions that limit noncompete agreements in ways other than geographical restrictions.
B. The Act and its Possible Effects
1. A review of the Act as currently enacted
The Post-Employment Restrictions Act became effective on May
10, 2016. 131 The Act applies to only one subset of post-employment
restrictions—non-compete agreements—and does not apply to nonsolicitation agreements, non-disclosure agreements, or confidentiality agreements. 132 Additionally, the legislature specifically
exempted severance agreements and non-compete agreements
related to selling a business from the Act. 133
The Act generally leaves the common law as is, 134 with one major
exception: “[A]n employer and an employee may not enter into a
[non-compete agreement] for a period of more than one year from
the day on which the employee is no longer employed by the
employer.” 135 Thus, the Act added certainty to the common law in
this area. 136 Any agreements entered into after the effective date that

130. See id. at *5 (“Because each of the six factors Utah courts use to determine the
reasonableness of non-compete clauses weigh[s] in favor of enforceability, the non-compete
clause is reasonable and therefore enforceable, based on the pleadings.”).
131. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 34-51-101 to -301 (West Supp. 2017).
132. Id. § 34-51-102(1)(b).
133. Id. § 34-51-202(2).
134. See id. § 34-51-201 (“In addition to any requirements imposed under common
law . . . .”).
135. Id.
136. Theoretically, a court could still decide that a non-compete agreement with less
than a one-year time restriction is unreasonable according to the particular facts and
circumstances of a case. See generally Sys. Concepts, Inc. v. Dixon, 669 P.2d 421, 427
(Utah 1983).
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violate the one-year provision are void. 137 Additionally, and most
importantly for purposes of this Comment, if a non-compete
agreement is deemed unenforceable by a court or arbitrator, “the
employer is liable for the employee’s: (1) costs associated with
arbitration; (2) attorney fees and court costs; and (3)
actual damages.” 138
2. The effects of the Act’s attorney’s fees provision
While the Act is laudable for the compromises represented in its
passing, 139 it leaves at least three significant questions about its effects
on Utah employers. First, the Act clearly states that courts must not
apply the one-year provision retroactively, 140 but the Act does not
state whether courts should apply the attorney’s fees provision
retroactively to non-compete agreements entered into before May
10, 2016. Therefore, agreements entered into before the Act was
even introduced to the legislature may still be subject to the Act’s
attorney’s fees provision. This concerning possibility is compounded
by the fact that courts may see the legislature’s decision to limit noncompetes to one year as persuasive evidence that any non-competes
with longer restrictions are unreasonable. Thus, despite the language
of the Act, its provisions may retroactively punish all non-compete
agreements exceeding one year.
Second, the Act fails to address court remedies, such as
bluelining 141 and redlining, 142 that reform unenforceable non-

137. UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-51-201.
138. Id. § 34-51-301.
139. Utah 2016 General Legislative Session, House – Day 44 2016 Part 3, at 2:19:52,
UTAH STATE LEGISLATURE, http://utahlegislature.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?clip_id=
20219&meta_id=629364 (last visited Dec. 2, 2017) (House Floor Debate on 10 H.B. 251,
Post-employment Restrictions Amendments, held Mar. 9, 2016) (statement of Rep. Schultz)
(discussing finding “a solution that is compatible to most people”).
140. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-51-201.
141. Raimonde v. Van Vlerah, 325 N.E.2d 544, 546 (Ohio 1975) (explaining that
bluelining, or the blue-pencil doctrine, “provides that if unreasonable provisions exist in [a
non-compete agreement], they may be stricken, if devisible, [sic] but not amended
or modified”).
142. John S. Beckmann, Business Torts and Non-Compete Agreements, in 5A MINNESOTA
PRACTICE SERIES, METHODS OF PRACTICE § 2, § 2.36 (Roger S. Haydock & Peter B. Knapp
eds., 4th ed. Supp. 2017) (explaining that redlining is the process of taking an overly broad
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compete agreements into enforceable ones. A court can apply both
remedies on its own or through a separate contractual provision
requiring reformation of the non-compete agreement. 143 No Utah
case has applied these doctrines to non-compete agreements, but
courts are not yet required to disregard the doctrines either. Thus, a
court could decide in the future to redline or blueline a noncompete agreement in an effort to create an enforceable agreement.
In such a situation, though the court would necessarily declare the
original agreement unenforceable to reform the agreement, the end
result of the case would be an enforceable agreement. 144 Whether the
attorney’s fees provision of the Act would apply in that case
is unclear.
Finally, the Act risks imposing attorney’s fees on employers who
make good-faith efforts to comply with the common-law
requirements, because attorney’s fees are imposed where “the postemployment restrictive covenant is unenforceable”—for any
reason. 145 The Act compounds this result by regulating only one
factor of the common law regarding non-compete agreements and
leaving the other factors open to continued court interpretation.
Attorney’s fees are generally “recoverable only if authorized by
contract or statute.” 146 Before the Act, the parties to a contract could
freely negotiate for an attorney’s fees provision in non-compete
agreements. Now, however, the Act unilaterally imposes attorney’s
fees in an area where fees were previously at the discretion of
the parties.

geographic or temporal scope and “slashing their tenure [or] more tightly circumscribing their
territorial limitations” to create a reasonable scope).
143. See id.; Alina Klimkina, Note, Are Noncompete Contracts Between Physicians Bad
Medicine? Advocating in the Affirmative by Drawing a Public Policy Parallel to the Legal
Profession, 98 KY. L.J. 131, 134 (2009).
144. See generally UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-51-301 (West Supp. 2017) (requiring an
award of attorney’s fees if “the post-employment restrictive covenant is unenforceable,” but
not discussing whether remedial tactics will delay this award).
145. Id.
146. Giles v. Mineral Res. Int’l, Inc., 2014 UT App 259, ¶ 17, 338 P.3d 825, 829–30.
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IV. A SOLUTION TO THE AUTOMATIC ATTORNEY’S FEES
PROVISION: LEAN ON NON-SOLICITATION AGREEMENTS
Because of the many risks associated with using non-compete
agreements in light of the automatic attorney’s fees provision and
the already confusing common law, some employers may be leery
about using non-compete agreements to protect their interests.
However, employers can protect many of these interests by another
common restrictive covenant—non-solicitation agreements. 147 Nonsolicitation agreements primarily prohibit a former employee from
soliciting a business’s customers or current employees to leave the
business. 148 Non-compete agreements and non-solicitation
agreements are both considered restrictive covenants 149 and are both
analyzed under the same common-law standards of Rose Park or
Robbins. 150 Thus, both are still subject to the same dizzying effects of
the common law as discussed in Part III, though non-solicitation
agreements receive greater deference because they are more specific
than non-compete agreements. 151 But unlike non-compete
147. Other methods also exist that may adequately substitute for non-competition
agreements. See Nicandri, supra note 43 (discussing the inevitable disclosure doctrine, the
Uniform Trade Secrets Act, The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, garden leave clauses,
forfeiture-for-competition clauses, and no-poach agreements). However, some of these
methods often contain more searching standards of review than a relatively orthodox contract
provision such as a non-solicitation agreement. See id. at 1019 (“Employers often enter into a
[non-compete agreement] in order to avoid having to prove the elements of trade secret
misappropriation [under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act] . . . .”). Other methods are far more
difficult to implement. See generally id. at 1025–32. This Comment focuses on non-solicitation
agreements due to these perceived deficiencies.
148. Nonsolicitation Agreement, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
149. See Brinton M. Wilkins, Enforcing Reasonable Restrictive Covenants Against Former
Employees, UTAH EMP. L. LETTER, Nov. 2015, at 4.
150. See Scenic Aviation, Inc. v. Blick, No. 2:02-CV-01201 PGC, 2003 WL 26060445,
at *5 (D. Utah Aug. 4, 2003) (analyzing a non-solicitation agreement under the Robbins
standard). But see Sys. W. Performance, LLC v. Farland, No. 2:14-cv-00276-DN-BCW, 2015
WL 4920962, at *3–5 (D. Utah Aug. 18, 2015) (analyzing a non-solicitation agreement
under the Rose Park standard).
151. Elizabeth E. Nicholas, Note, Drafting Enforceable Non-Solicitation Agreements in
Kentucky, 95 KY. L.J. 505, 508 (2006) (discussing non-solicitation agreements generally); see
also M. SCOTT MCDONALD & JACQUELINE C. JOHNSON, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION IN EMPLOYMENT LAW: CONTRACT SOLUTIONS AND
LITIGATION GUIDE 626 (2014) (“[N]onsolicitation clauses are more commonly viewed as
something different and more readily enforced [than non-compete clauses].”).
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agreements, non-solicitation agreements are excepted from the
automatic attorney’s fees provision of the Act. 152 Therefore, an
employer will not be automatically penalized if an employer fails to
navigate the common-law landscape to draft an enforceable nonsolicitation agreement. This Part will discuss the benefits and
drawbacks of relying on non-solicitation agreements to protect
employer interests and examine some practical ways to balance nonsolicitation and non-compete agreements to effectuate this goal.
A. Non-Compete Agreements and
Non-Solicitation Agreements: A Comparison
Non-compete and non-solicitation agreements are “similar
instruments” 153 because non-solicitation agreements also protect
most of the employer’s four interests protected by non-compete
agreements. 154 First, non-solicitation agreements also promote an
employer’s goodwill by preventing an employee from drawing away
the customers and other employees that partially define this
goodwill. 155 In fact, one court, commenting on the nuances of
company goodwill, said, “[Goodwill] is the probability that old
customers will resort to the old place or seek old friends . . . .” 156 If
an employee were to leave and pull away customers and “friends,” or
other employees, company goodwill would thus be damaged. Nonsolicitation agreements prevent this from happening.
Second, non-solicitation agreements also protect an employer’s
investment in employee training by persuasively constraining
employees from leaving the employer for greener pastures after the

152. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
153. Erin E. Gould, Comment, Read the Fine Print: A Critical Look at Oregon’s
Noncompete and Nonsolicitation Agreement Laws, 88 OR. L. REV. 515, 518 (2009).
154. See discussion supra Part II. Non-compete agreements protect an employer’s trade
secrets, promote an employer’s goodwill, protect an employer’s investment in employee
training, and foster company research and development.
155. See generally Allen v. Rose Park Pharmacy, 237 P.2d 823, 827–28 (Utah 1951)
(“[A] covenant not to compete is necessary for the protection of the goodwill of the business
when it is shown that although the employee learns no trade secrets, he may likely draw away
customers from his former employer, if he were permitted to compete nearby.”).
156. Peterson v. Jackson, 2011 UT App 113, ¶ 35, 253 P.3d 1096, 1106 (quoting
Jackson v. Caldwell, 415 P.2d 667, 670 (Utah 1966)).
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employee completes the training. 157 On its face, the agreement does
not restrict an employee from working in a particular area or for a
particular company like a non-compete agreement. But nonsolicitation agreements may increase relocation costs enough to
disincentivize the employee from leaving because non-solicitation
agreements prevent employees from taking an established client base
to another company—often a base with which the employee has
spent time developing relationships. 158 Additionally, discovering that
another employer’s employee is under a non-solicitation agreement
may discourage a possible employer from hiring that employee. 159
In addition to protecting an employer’s investment in a specific
employee’s training, non-solicitation agreements may also protect an
employer’s investment in the training of all employees. Many nonsolicitation agreements contain two parts: “agreements not to solicit
employees, and agreements not to solicit clients.” 160 Thus, even if an
employee decides that the benefits of moving to another company
outweigh the difficulty of developing a new client base, the nonsolicitation agreement will prohibit the employee from pulling away
other employees to work with him or her at the new company,
thereby protecting an employer’s investment in those other
employees’ training.
However, except for the employer’s customer lists that are
impliedly protected under the agreement, non-solicitation
agreements do not provide strong protection against an employee

157. See MCDONALD & JOHNSON, supra note 151, at 674 (justifying non-solicitation
clauses because they protect against “conversion of . . . specialized training”).
158. As an example, imagine a salesperson who signs a non-solicitation agreement before
beginning employment with a medical device company. The salesperson then expends a
significant amount of time finding clients and developing professional relationships with these
clients, most of whom are doctors. The clients are pleased with the salesperson and the
products being sold, so the clients refer the salesperson to others. If this salesperson were to
leave the medical device company and work for a competitor, the salesperson would be
prohibited from selling to any former clients, and thus, again, the salesperson would have to
spend time finding clients and building professional relationships.
159. See Mary L. Mikva, Drafting Confidentiality, Non-Compete, and Non-Solicitation
Agreements: The Employee’s Wish List, PRAC. LAW., June 2004, at 11, 14 (A non-solicitation
agreement “can and often does interfere with a departing employee’s ability to get
another job.”).
160. Id.
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misappropriating an employer’s trade secrets. 161 To shore up this lack
of protection, employers could utilize specific confidentiality
agreements in their employee contracts designed to prohibit
misappropriation of trade secrets. 162 Employers could also rely on the
limited non-compete agreement discussed below to provide the
requisite amount of protection.
Finally, non-solicitation agreements foster research and
development more effectively than non-compete agreements. Many
employers still adhere to the belief that non-compete agreements
promote research and development by incentivizing employers to
spend more on employee training “without fear that . . . competitors
will poach knowledgeable employees.” 163 But “[a] growing number
of recent empirical studies on innovation and economic growth
overwhelmingly suggest that the flow of people and information
have significant positive effects, or spillovers, on markets.” 164 This
flow may “actually drive further innovation,” 165 contrary to employer
beliefs. Using non-solicitation agreements will encourage spillovers
by allowing employees to freely move between employers, thus
increasing research and development.
B. Balancing the Use of Non-Compete Agreements and
Non-Solicitation Agreements to Create Strong Employer Protection
with Minimal Risk
Even in light of the new risks brought by the Act, non-compete
agreements still have value for employers. They can narrowly tailor
non-compete agreements to sufficiently protect employer interests
that are not covered by non-solicitation agreements. The following

161. See William G. Porter, II & Michael C. Griffaton, Identifying and Protecting
Employers’ Interests in Trade Secrets and Proprietary Information, 68 DEF. COUNS. J. 439, 446
(2001) (quoting Abraham Zion Corp. v. LeBow, 593 F. Supp. 551, 569 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)
(“[A] former employee may not solicit the customers of his former employer if they would be
unknown to the employee but for information obtained during his prior employment.”).
162. See Mack, supra note 114, at 1211 (“A confidentiality agreement is ‘[a] promise
not to disclose trade secrets or other proprietary information learned in the course of the
parties’ relationship.’”).
163. Nicandri, supra note 43, at 1013; see Petersen & Stelter, supra note 15.
164. Amir & Lobel, supra note 57, at 856.
165. Nicandri, supra note 43, at 1014.
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discussion illustrates practical ways to protect these interests by using
both agreements.
1. Drafting narrowly tailored non-compete agreements
Non-compete agreements may be used primarily to protect trade
secrets, an interest that non-solicitation agreements do not protect as
strongly as non-compete agreements. Employers can do four things
to draft narrowly tailored non-compete agreements that are likely
enforceable by Utah courts.
First, employers should incorporate non-compete agreements
only into the contracts of employees who actually come in contact
with trade secrets. By doing this, employers will ensure that the
unique interest that non-compete agreements protect—trade
secrets—corresponds with the employees who have access to them.
Limiting non-compete agreements to employees who utilize trade
secrets will naturally limit the possibility that a court will determine a
non-compete agreement unenforceable because fewer non-compete
agreements will exist to declare unenforceable.
Second, and more importantly, even if the agreement is
adjudicated, a court will consider protecting trade secrets as a
legitimate interest. 166 In the non-compete agreement, employers can
explicitly state that the purpose for their non-compete agreements is
to protect trade secrets because only employees with access to trade
secrets signed non-compete agreements. 167 By spelling out “the
legitimate business interest [an employer is] trying to protect,”168
employers may avoid the possibility of a court determining that

166. See Sys. Concepts, Inc. v. Dixon, 669 P.2d 421, 426 (Utah 1983) (“We hold that a
covenant is valid which protects good will as well as trade secrets.”).
167. However, employers should also be clear that the time restriction in the noncompete agreement applies only to the former employee working for competitors. The
proprietary information’s status as trade secrets should survive the termination of the noncompete agreement; otherwise, the trade secrets may no longer be protected under any
confidentiality or other agreements to that effect. See Julianne M. Hartzell, Time Limits in
Confidentiality Agreements, INTELL. PROP. LITIG., Spring 2009, at 1.
168. Employers May Face New Challenges in Drafting Noncompetes, 19 UTAH EMP. L.
LETTER, Oct. 2013, at 4, 6.
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the non-compete agreement has an illegitimate interest that
is unenforceable. 169
Third, employers can restrict the agreement to a time limit that
satisfies the Act and is also reasonable for their particular industries.
The Act specifies only that non-compete agreements with temporal
restrictions lasting longer than one year are unenforceable; 170 it does
not specify that temporal restrictions up to and including one year
are automatically enforceable. 171 While it is difficult to imagine a
situation in which a less-than-one-year time restriction would be
unreasonable, it is possible. 172 Thus, employers should determine
whether a one-year time restriction is reasonable under the
circumstances. Generally, a time period that relates to the time it
would take to adequately find and train a replacement is likely a
reasonable restriction. 173
Finally, employers can restrict the geographic area of the noncompete agreement to increase the reasonableness of the restriction.
Restricting the area to either the geographic area for which the
employee was responsible or the area in which the employee’s
customers are mainly located will increase the reasonableness of the
non-compete agreement’s geographic restriction. 174
2. Drafting aggressive non-solicitation agreements
If an employer uses non-compete agreements primarily to
protect trade secrets, the employer can then use non-solicitation
agreements to protect employer goodwill and investment in
employees, the two interests that both non-solicitation and noncompete agreements protect. 175 Besides attempting to comply with
common law requirements, to draft effective, aggressive non169. For example, a primary purpose of restricting employee mobility would invalidate a
non-compete agreement. See Robbins v. Finlay, 645 P.2d 623, 627 (Utah 1982).
170. UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-51-201 (West Supp. 2017).
171. See generally id.
172. See Bryceland v. Northey, 772 P.2d 36, 40 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989) (opining that the
time needed to replace an employee, in this case fourteen weeks, would be an appropriate time
restriction in a restrictive covenant).
173. Sill, supra note 118, at 376.
174. Id. at 381.
175. See supra Section IV.A.
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solicitation agreements, employers should also keep three things
in mind.
First, employers should create entirely separate non-solicitation
agreements in their employment contracts. Non-solicitation and
non-compete agreements are often combined into the same
contractual provision because they are so similar. 176 However,
combining the two may present a challenge for a court if it must
later determine whether it can separate the non-compete aspect of
the provision for purposes of the Act. Thus, because separating the
two agreements will avoid this problem, employers should
consider keeping the two agreements unconnected in their
employment contracts.
Second, employers should not leave the term “solicitation”
undefined but should instead define the term broadly to encompass
areas that a common standard dictionary definition of “solicit”
might exclude. In contracts, as in other areas of law, undefined terms
are generally given their ordinary and plain meaning.177 Therefore, if
a non-solicitation agreement uses the term “solicit” and does not
define it, a court could conclude that “solicit” means “to approach
with a request or plea” and “to try to obtain by usually urgent
requests or pleas.” 178 Thus, the non-solicitation agreement might not
provide any protection for the employer if, for example, a former
employee recruits a third party and directs that party to target the
employer’s customers since the employee is not the actual person
doing the asking. “Solicit” should be well defined to encompass this
and any other possibilities not covered by the ordinary meaning.
Third, the agreement should include a favorable choice of venue
provision that allows the employer to quickly access a courthouse to
file an injunction against any former employees who violate the non-

176. See Gould, supra note 153, at 520.
177. See Hi-Country Prop. Rights Grp. v. Emmer, 2013 UT 33, ¶ 18, 304 P.3d 851,
855–56 (giving undefined statutory terms their ordinary meaning); Bear River Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Williams, 2006 UT App 500, ¶ 13, 153 P.3d 798, 801 (looking to ordinary and common
meaning of undefined terms in an insurance policy); Salem City v. Farnsworth, 753 P.2d 514,
515 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (giving “[u]ndefined words in a zoning ordinance . . . their plain
and ordinary meaning”).
178. Solicit, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
solicit (last visited Jan. 3, 2018).
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solicitation agreement. For most companies, this means that the
choice of venue will be the state where the company has its primary
place of business. By including a favorable, close venue, employers
can minimize the effects of any wayward past employee who does
violate the non-solicitation agreement.
V. CONCLUSION
Companies have flourished in Utah for a variety of reasons,
including favorable state corporation laws. However, the PostEmployment Restrictions Act will likely injure Utah businesses who,
in good faith, try to enforce non-compete agreements. By passing
the Act, the legislature imposes automatic penalties on employers
who try to enforce what could be considered reasonable noncompete agreements but instead are held unreasonable through a
confusing set of common law requirements. To minimize this risk
while still protecting the employer’s interests that non-compete
agreements are designed to protect, employers can forego aggressive
non-compete agreements altogether. Instead, employers can draft
narrowly tailored non-compete agreements in conjunction with
aggressive non-solicitation agreements that are (1) separated from
the non-compete agreements, (2) defined in their scope, and (3)
drafted to provide for quick enforcement through favorable choice of
venue provisions. Doing so will protect their interests and mitigate
the risk of incurring automatic attorney’s fees.
Jerrick Robbins*
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